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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a first degree murder case; its outcome ,.vill determine whether Mark
Lankford will serve the harshest non-capital sentence a person can serve: a life sentence
without the possibility of parole. Mark 1 is challenging his judgment of conviction and
sentence, as well as the district court's orders denying his requests for a new trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were explained in Mark's
Appellant's Brief and are incorporated here by reference. However, Mark does want to
correct the State's misrepresentation of facts in its Statement of Facts and Course of
Proceedings. After summarizing Mark's testimony, the State claims Mark's attorney, in
closing argument, "conceded 'A lot of what [Lankford] said doesn't make sense to me."'
(Resp't Br. 8 (quoting Tr., p.1859).) The State represents this statement reflects Mark's
attorney did not believe Mark's testimony or think it made sense. That is false. The State
took a snippet of counsel's argument and placed it completely out of context. The full
quote from closing argument puts the statement in context, which gives it a meaning
opposite of that assigned by the State.
What Mark has told you has never changed in 25 years. A lot of what he
said doesn't make sense to me having been raised in Montana and Idaho.
I've never covered up my car in my life. I've never covered up my fire
place. I don't put limbs over my fire place. When I leave I might throw
some water on it or old coffee or something. Why would you do that?
When I first became Mark's attorney the first thing I asked him, what did
you cover your car up for? Why did you walk down the road and not take

1Mark

Lankford is referenced herein by his first name, rather than Mr. Lankford, to
distinguish him from his brothers, Bryan and Lee John, who will also be referenced by
their first names. For consistency, Lane Thomas will be referenced herein by his first
name.

1

your car? That is the stupidest thing I ever heard of. Well, it was my pride
and joy. I had everything I had in it I didn't want anybody to
that
car. I didn't want anybody to steal it. You don't know what it's like in
You
your car out there somebody is going to take
stuff.
It made sense, especially after Mr. Urban Valentine testified that Texas is
mostly private ground and the reason he went out on the Trinity River was
because the person who was renting that farm ground or that bottomland
was wanting those people trespassed. And when you grow up in Idaho
where 90 percent of the property in this state is public ground, you don't
even think about those things. Youjust go up into the forest and camp.
(Tr., p.1859, L.15

p.1860, L.13 (emphasis added).) The only concession defense

counsel made in closing argument was that growing up in Idaho and Montana, he was
ignorant of why Mark did things the way he did, but once Mark explained why, "It made
sense .... "
Mark also objects to the State's repeated failure to cite to specific lines of the
transcripts it relies upon in its briefing. Idaho Appellate Rule 35( e) requires citation to the
reporter's transcript, including the transcript page and line number; this requirement
applies not only to attorneys, but to pro se litigants on appeal. (Idaho Pro Se Appellate
Handbook,

How

should

I

format

my

citations?,

PDF

http://\vvvw.isc.idaho.gov/files/IdahoAppel1ateinforn1ationHandbook 2013.pdf,

pp.15-16,
last

viewed October 2, 2015.) Mark Lankford has complied with the appellate mles and
provided this Court with citation to portions of transcripts he relies upon to support his
claims, including relevant page and line numbers. In contrast, the State places the onus on
Mark and this Court to divine which portions of cited transcript pages it relies upon to
support its arguments. The State's consistent failure to cite to transcript line numbers and
follow basic citation rules that govern even pro se litigants, cannot be condoned. Mark
urges this Court to disregard the State's citation to transcripts which fail to include line
numbers.
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ISSUES 2
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY PROVIDING MARK'S JURY
IMPROPER AND AMBIGUOUS INSTRUCTIONS
RELIEVED THE STATE OF ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AND
DEPRIVED HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL
UNDER
THE
UNITED
STATES
AND
IDAHO
CONSTITUTIONS
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S INSTRUCTION TELLING JURORS OF
MARK'S PRIOR CHARGES, CONVICTIONS AND APPELLATE
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE SAME OFFENSES IN THIS CASE
VIOLATED MARK'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JURY

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
MARK'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE COURT'S
VIOLATIONS OF IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2405

IV.

THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO AND
ELICITATION OF TESTIMONY REGARDING MARK'S PRIOR BAD
ACTS,
PRIOR CONVICTION,
DEATH
SENTENCE
AND
CONFINEMENT ON DEA TH ROW THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL,
REP EA TEDL Y CALLING MARK A LIAR AND BOLSTERING
TESTIMONY OF STATE WITNESSES IN CLOSING ARGUMENT,
AND HIS SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING DEALS HE
MADE FOR SNITCH TESTIMONY, CONSTITUTE MISCONDUCT
ENTITLING MARK TO A NEW TRIAL

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MARK'S MOTION TO
CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE, OR A SENTENCE IMPOSED
IN AN ILLEGAL MANNER, BASED ON UNTIMELINESS

2Mark

responds only to those issues which demand a response in light of the
Respondent's Brief, but otherwise relies upon his prior briefing, which he incorporates
here by reference.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred Bv Providing Mark's Jury With Improper And Ambiguous
Instructions Which Relieved The State Oflts Burden Of Proof And Deprived Him Of His
Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial Under The United States And Idaho Constitutions

The district court's verbal and written instructions to Mark's jury, considered as a
whole, gave conflicting explanations of the elements of first degree felony murder the
State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Mark did not object to the
problematic instructions, contrary to the State's claim (Resp't Br., pp.17-18), he did not
ask for them either. Because the error was not invited, fundamental error review is
proper. Mark must show the instructional defects are of constitutional dimension, they are
plain from the record, and the instructions prejudiced him or misled the jury. Instructions
like these which relieve the State of its burden of proof and allow it to gain a conviction
without proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, meet the
fundamental error standard because they violate due process and deprive a defendant of a
fair trial. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,
472-73 (2012).
Jurors were instructed that Mark was charged by information with two counts of
first degree felony murder in which the State alleged he and/or his brother, Bryan,
unlawfully and with malice aforethought killed Robert and Cheryl Bravence by beating
them with an unknown object in the perpetration of a robbery. (JI 2, JI 4.) Jurors were
twice instructed that for both counts of first degree murder, Mark could be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt if the State proved he was either "a principal to or aided and
abetted in the commission of a robbery [d]uring which an unlawful killing of Robert [and
Cheryl] Bravence occurred." (JI 4, JI 11.) The court explained to jurors that legally, there

4

is no difference between someone "who directly participates in the acts constituting a
a person who, either before or during

comm1ss10n,

facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsel, solicits, invites, helps or hires another
to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission." (JI 18.) The court
further explained the law considers anyone who "participates in a crime either before or
during its commission, by intentionally aiding, abetting, advising, hiring, counseling,
procuring another to commit the crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission
are guilty of the crime" to be a principal to the crime. (JI 19.)
Both below and on appeal, the State argues because the Bravences' deaths
occurred during the "stream of events" constituting the robbery, Mark is guilty.
Specifically, the State argues "[b ]ased upon the testimony presented, it is certainly
probable that, while the Bravences were mortally wounded at the campsite, they did not
die until after their bodies were concealed."3 (Resp't Br., p.21.) The State thus argues
Mark is responsible for the Bravences' deaths under the felony murder rule even if Bryan
alone robbed the Bravences and killed them, or if Bryan mortally injured but did not kill
the Bravences at the campsite, because he helped Bryan load their bodies in the van and
conceal them. (Id. pp.21-22.) The State's argument reveals why the instructions,
considered as a whole, were ambiguous and may have been applied by the jury in a way
that relieved the State of its burden of proof.

3 The

prosecutor suggested that even if the victims were dead when Mark took their
property, he was guilty of robbery and felony murder. (Tr., p.1868, L.16-p.1869, L.6.)

5

Multiple theories regarding the robbery and homicides were presented to Mark's
.4

Under one of

State's theories, Bryan and Mark formed the

to steal the

Bravences' van prior to the homicides, rendering them both liable for the homicides,
regardless of who inflicted the fatal blows. Under the State's other theory, Bryan
intended to steal the Bravences' van when he inflicted mortal or fatal injuries upon the
couple; after Bryan took their van and belongings, Mark helped Bryan conceal their
bodies and later benefited from the proceeds of the robbery. Under the defense theory,
Bryan alone intended to steal the Bravences' van before he killed them, and after he
completed the murders, Mark helped him conceal the bodies and benefitted from the
robbery proceeds.
Under the State's first theory, Mark would clearly be guilty of first degree felony
murder because he had the intent to commit the robbery before the Bravences' were
killed. However, under the State's second theory, and under the defense theory, Mark
could not be guilty of first degree felony murder because he had no intent to rob the
Bravences before they were killed by Bryan. Nevertheless, the prosecutor and judge told
jurors that the crime of robbery could be committed against a deceased victim. (Tr.,
p.1868, L.16

p.1869, L.6.) Because the court's oral and written jury instructions were

ambiguous and conflicting when considered as a whole, particularly when coupled with
the prosecutor's arguments in closing, the jury may have found Mark guilty of first

4In

the Appellant's Brief, undersigned counsel stated two different theories were
presented to the jury regarding the robbery and homicide. (Appellant's Br., p.29.) Insofar
as this assertion limits the theories presented below to two options, it is inaccurate. There
were two theories presented to the jury by the State, and one presented by the defense.

6

degree felony murder even though the State did not prove him guilty of every element of
degree felony (robbery) murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the State's argument to the jury below, and to this Court on appeal,
is that if Mark benefited from the robbery after Bryan killed the Bravences, or if he
helped Bryan hide their bodies after Bryan took their van and belongings against their
will, before or after they breathed their last breaths, he is guilty of first degree felony
murder. The State's arguments are legally incorrect. Mark was charged with first degree
murder during the perpetration of a robbery. If Mark did not specifically intend to
commit the robbery before it occurred, or before the Bravences were killed, he is not
guilty of felony murder. See State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144 (201 0); State v. Cheatham,
134 Idaho 565, 571 (2000). "Where the intent to commit the felony does not arise until
after the homicide has occurred, the rationale behind the rule no longer applies."

Cheatham, 134 Idaho at 571. As this Court observed in Cheatham, when the offense
alleged is felony murder involving robbery,
a taking is still robbery regardless of when the intent to formed, as long as
the defendant's force motivated the victim's surrender of her property.
When the force applied causes death, it is difficult to see how force could
have motivated the victim to surrender the property, since the victim is
dead.

Id. at 570 (emphasis in original). Similarly, where the force used against the Bravences'
to take their property against their will was inflicted only by Bryan, even if Mark helped
moved their unconscious or lifeless bodies, Mark's actions could not have motivated the
Bravences to surrender property Bryan had already taken by force.
Mark's jury should have been clearly instructed that in light of the different
theories presented by the parties, the threshold question it had to decide was whether the

7

State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mark-not Mark and Bryan, and not
Bryan-intended to take the personal property of the Bravences from their person or
immediate possession, against their will, by the intentional use or force of fear, prior to
their deaths. The jury should have been instructed that if they did not find Mark
specifically intended to take the Bravences' property from their person or immediate
possession while they were alive, and against their will, by the intentional use of force or
fear, either acting with Bryan or acting alone, they had to find Mark not guilty. While
Mark's jury was provided with an instruction advising them they had to find Mark
intended to rob the Bravences prior to their deaths (JI 12), when coupled with the aiding
and abetting in the felony murder elements instruction (JI 11 ), the separate aiding and
abetting instructions (JI 18-19), the prosecutor's arguments, and the judge's oral
instructions, the jury could have found Bryan intended to rob the Bravences prior to their
deaths, and because Mark later helped move their bodies and benefitted from the robbery
proceeds, he was guilty as an aider and abettor. That is not the law, but the instructions,
taken as a whole, allowed Mark's jury to reach such a conclusion.
Moreover, when defense counsel tried to argue this point in closing argument, the
prosecutor objected and the district court intervened. In closing argument, defense
counsel was reading the robbery elements instruction (JI 13) to the jury and explaining
why the State could not meet their burden of proof. Counsel restated the instruction and
when he got to the allegation that Mark took the Bravences' property from their person or
immediate presence, and against their will, he stated, "And this is the reason you can't

rob a dead person---." (Tr., p.1868, L.16 - p.1869, L.6 (emphasis added).) The
prosecutor objected: "Your Honor, I object. I don't think that is a correct statement of the

8

law." The district court, in the jury's presence, agreed with the prosecutor: "I don't either.
Well, Ladies and Gentlemen,

instructed on the law, so go to my instructions and

refer to that." (Id) The court's instruction was a clear statement to jurors that, as a matter
of law, you can rob a dead person. As a result, even if Mark did not do anything but take
prope1iy from the Bravences after Bryan killed or mortally wounded them, Mark's own
testimony would be sufficient for the jury to find him guilty of robbery and thus felony
murder. Jurors were explicitly and repeatedly told the judge would instruct them on the
law applicable to this case, and they had to consider the evidence in light of the judge's
instructions on the law, regardless of their own beliefs. (JI 1, JI 3, JI 5, JI 10, JI 24, JI 25,
JI 27.)
For these reasons, the verbal and written jury instructions, taken as a whole, were
ambiguous, conflicting and erroneous. The collective instructions allowed the jury to find
Mark guilty of first degree murder even though the State did not have to prove every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby violating Mark's due process
rights and depriving him of a fair trial. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999);

State v. Adamcik. 152 Idaho 445, 472-73 (2012). Accordingly, Mark's conviction must be
vacated and his case remanded for a new trial.
II.
The District Court's Instruction Telling Jurors Mark Was Previouslv Charged And
Convicted For These Offenses, Which Were The Subject Of A Prior Appeal, Violated
Mark's Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury
The district court's instruction telling jurors about Mark's prior charges,
convictions and appeals in this case violated Mark's constitutional right to a fair trial
before an impartial jury. Although Mark did not specifically object to the instruction,
contrary to the State's claim (Resp't Br., p.23), he did not acquiesce to it either. Because

9

counsel did not object to the district court advising jurors of Mark's prior trial, conviction
and appellate proceedings, the error is

to fimdamental error

V,

151 Idaho 576,588 (2011); State v. Peny, 150 Idaho 209,228 (2010).
By framing the issue as jurors' knowledge of Mark's prior trial, rather than jurors'
knowledge of Mark's prior trial and prior guilt verdict, the State claims Mark has failed
to cite any cases where a court found a constitutional violation that required reversal of a
conviction. To the contrary, other courts have recognized jurors' knowledge that the
defendant was previously found guilty of the same offense for which he is now on trial is
so prejudicial as to constitute a denial of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
See. e.g.. Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d I 034, 1044-46 (Del. I 985) (holding jurors'
knowledge of defendant's prior trial and conviction for same offense, which was
discussed among jurors prior to deliberations, raised a presumption of jury bias that
violated the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury); State v. Lee, 346 So. 2d 682,
683-85 (La. 1977) ("When a jury is informed by the state that the accused was convicted
of the crime on a previous occasion, the defendant's right to a fair trial, protected by both
the federal and state constitutions, has been violated."). 5 See also, e.g., Fullwood v. Lee,
290 F.3d 663, 682-83 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing, in dicta, that a violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial may occur if the jury learned
the defendant had previously been found guilty of murder and sentenced to death). But cf
State v. Dunlap. 155 Idaho 345, 366 (2013) (holding sentencing jurors' knowledge that
district court previously imposed death sentence in same case was not error).

5Compare

State v. Williams, 445 So. 2d 1171, 1177 (La. 1984) (holding prosecutor's
remarks and elicitation of testimony referencing defendant's prior trial, but not his prior
conviction, was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial).
IO

Other courts that have dealt with this issue, although not asked to
agreed that while a fleeting

constitutional grounds, have

on
to a

prior trial is a relatively minor error that can be cured with an instruction, a reference to
the outcome of a former trial is so extraordinarily prejudicial that it will typically require
a new trial. See, e.g., Arthur v. Bordenkircher, 715 F.2d 118, 118-20 (4 th Cir. 1983)
("[W]e are hard pressed to think of anything more damning to an accused than
information that a jury had previously convicted him for the crime charged." (internal
quotes omitted)); United States v. Attell, 655 F.2d 703, 704-05 (5 th Cir. 1981) (holding
pretrial publicity which reported the defendant had previously been convicted of the
charged offense required reversal of the defendant's conviction); Frazier v. State, 632 So.
2d 1002, 1007 (Ala. Ct. App. 1993) ("The appellant asserts that the prosecutor committed
reversible error when he referred to the appellant's previous conviction for the offense for
which he was being tried. We must agree.")6; Williams v. State, 629 P.2d 54, 58-60
(Alaska 1981) (holding trial court erred in denying the defense's motion for a mistrial
following prosecutor's statement that defendant's prior jury trial for the same offense was
hung 11 to I); Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d I 069, 1076-77 (Del. 1987) ("The jury not only
learned that the defendant had been previously tried for the same charge, but that the
1980 trial had ended in a conviction. That information, regardless of how it is received, is
inherently prejudicial and even more so when a jury is exposed to those facts during
trial."); Duque v. State, 498 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding where
newspaper article published during the defendant's trial reported the defendant had been

6 Compare

Sneed v. State, 1 So. 3d 104, 114-15 (Ala. Ct. App. 2007) (holding where
"none of the references to a first trial or to prior proceedings specifically informed the
11

convicted at her first trial, the trial court's refusal to grant defense counsel's motion to
about
(Ga.

App.2000) (holding

was reversible error) 7 ; Hood v. State,

788,

prosecutor brought up the defendant's prior trial

but not the prior guilty verdict, the trial court's curative instructions on the matter \Vere
sufficient); People v. Jones, 528 N.E.2d 648, 658 (Ill. 1988) (holding where witness's
testimony that she had seen particular evidence at "the last trial," did not reveal outcome
of the prior trial and jurors were advised by the court to disregard her testimony, the brief
remark did not prejudice the defendant or impair his right to a fair trial)8; Major v.
Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 706, 716-17 (Ky. 2009) (holding witness's testimony
referring briefly to prior trial, but not the outcome, when coupled with the trial court's
admonition to disregard the testimony, was not prejudicial and did not warrant a mistrial);

Coffey v. State, 642 A.2d 276, 281-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding experienced police
officers' repeated testimony that the defendant had previously been tried and convicted of
the same charges, where curative instruction served to emphasize the inadmissible
testimony, required mistrial because it deprived the defendant of a fair trial). Cf State v.
Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 766-67 (Ct App. 2012) (holding police officer's reference to
prior trial and appeal in testimony did not warrant mistrial where officer did not testify

jury that the appellant had previously been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death," the references were not plain error).
7See also Weber v. State, 501 So. 2d 1379, 1381-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("Courts
which have confronted the discrete issue posed by the present case have uniformly
concluded that the prejudice arising from the exposure of jurors to information that the
defendant was previously convicted of the very offense for which he is on trial is so great
that neither an ordinary admonition of the jurors nor the jurors' ritualistic assurances that
they have not been affected by the information can overcome it.").
8Cl l'vfcDonnell v. AfcPartlin, 736 N.E.2d 1074, 1091 (Ill. 2000) (holding brief, non-fact
specific reference by witness to billing done "through the trial of last year," was not
prejudicial).
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defendant was convicted, court gave curative instruction and evidence of guilt was
overwhelming).
When Mark's motion to exclude references to the prior trial was discussed at
pretrial hearings, the district court asked the prosecutor "You do agree that prior
conviction, prior charges, prior incarceration, are not admissible?" the prosecutor
responded, "I do, Your Honor." (11/21/07 Tr., p.36, Ls.19-21.) The district court
affirmed, "Yeah, I do, too. I think that's a given." (Id., p.36, Ls.22-23.) During those
same discussions about how to handle witness testimony from the prior trial, defense
counsel suggested "the proper thing to do in that regard would be to state that at

just

state, during your previous testimony did you state the following. Rather than saying,
during the first trial in this case did you state the following." (Id., p.102, Ls.3-7.) The
district court agreed, acknowledging, "Mr. Lankford comes in with a presumption of
innocence, and if the jury knows there's already been a conviction that presumption has a
tough time having any air left." (Id., p.102, Ls.13-16.) Nevertheless, the district court
instructed jurors that Mark had been tried for the same crimes, but that an appellate court
reversed his conviction because he was not effectively represented. (1/28/08 Voir Dire
Tr., p.115, Ls.6-18.)
Contrary to the State's repeated assertions (Resp't Br., p.28), there is nothing in
the record showing Mark "acquiesced to the district court's advisement and instruction."
(Id.) As this Court has long recognized, "[t]he district court, a court of record speaks
through its record." Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 634 (1967). "The acts of a court of
record are known by its records alone and cannot be established by parol testimony, the
court speaks only though its records, and the judge speaks only through the court." Id
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(quoting with approval Herren v. People, 363 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Colo. 1961) (en bane)).
Despite this, the State asks this Court to assume that despite Mark's written objection,
the parties reached a contrary agreement to instruct jurors about his prior conviction and
related proceedings. This Court has refused to presume fundamental enor stemming from
alleged prosecutorial misconduct, when the only proof is a silent record, State v. Wright,
97 Idaho 229, 233 (1975); this Court should similarly refuse to presume Mark agreed to
tell jurors about his prior trial, conviction and related proceedings, not just from a silent
record, but a contrary record.
The State agrees Mark's jury was instructed he was tried in 1984 for the same
crimes, but that an appeals court had decided Mark was not effectively represented in that
trial, rendering the trial unfair. (Resp't Br., pp.30-32.) The record also clearly reflects the
prosecutor elicited testimony during the state's case-in-chief that Mark had been on death
row for twenty-three years for two murders in Grangeville, he was friends with guards at
the prison, and he and Bryan were on death row together for many years. (Tr., p.1248,
L.21 - p.1249, L.3, p.1276, Ls.9-11, p.1325, Ls.1-6, p.1323, Ls.2-10, p.1328, Ls.18-23,
p.1328, L.24

p.1329, L.24.)

Based on these facts, the State argues that while jurors knew of the prior trial and
appeal in this case, jurors were not told and did not know Mark had been found guilty at
the prior trial. (Resp't Br., p.30 ("The jury in Lankford's case was not so instructed, but
merely advised there was a prior trial and an appellate court held his trial was unfair;
there was no statement that he was previously found guilty.").) The State's argument is
premised on the belief that Mark's jury was too ignorant to draw a basic and reasonable
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inference fi:om the facts. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from

facts is

that Mark was found guilty of the Bravences' murders.
Assuming the State's argument has merit, testimony that Mark was on death row
for decades is even more prejudicial because the jury had to assume Mark was on death
row for killing someone other than the Bravences. Where a "jury not only learns that a
defendant has been previously tried for the same charge, but that the [prior] trial had
ended in a conviction, [t]hat information, regardless of how it is received, is inherently
prejudicial and even more so when a jury is exposed to those facts during trial." Bailey v.

State, 521 A.2d at 1076-77. Here, jurors' knowledge of Mark's prior trial and conviction
for the same offenses was inherently prejudicial, depriving Mark of his presumption of
innocence and his constitutional right to fair trial before an impartial jury.
The State next claims Mark's trial counsel made a strategic choice to tell jurors
about his prior trial and convictions for the same crimes, as well his time on death row, so
the errors Mark complains of now do not "plainly exist," thereby failing to meet the
second prong of the fundamental error standard. First, there is no evidence such a choice
was ever made; though the record is pregnant with counsel's expressions of concern and
indecision on this point, indecision is neither a choice nor a decision. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo counsel decided to tell jurors about Mark's prior trial, prior
convictions and death sentences for the same offenses, it was objectively unreasonable.
Strategic choices "are owed deference commensurate with the reasonableness of the
professional judgments on which they are based." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 681 (1984). A cursory review of the case law reveals near universal condemnation
of telling jurors about a defendant's prior trial and conviction for the same offenses; these
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cases emphasize the inherent prejudice that results from sharing this information with
jurors. Even if counsel decided to share this inherently prejudicial information with
Mark's jury, the decision was objectively unreasonable.
Finally, as the cases above reveal, telling jurors the defendant has been previously
tried and convicted of the same charges is inherently prejudicial, affecting the base
structure of the constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury, consistent with
structural e1Tor. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28 (2010) ("Where the e1Tor in
question is a constitutional violation found to constitute a structural defect, affecting the
base structure of the trial to the point that a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function
as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, the appellate court shall
automatically vacate and remand."). The United States Supreme has defined structural
e1Tor as a
structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds,
rather than simply an eITor in the trial process itself. Without these basic
protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle
for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may
be regarded as fundamentally fair.

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Even if not deemed structural, the error in advising jurors of Mark's prior trial,
conviction death sentence, and appeal for the same offenses, affected Mark's substantial
rights and affected the outcome of his trial. To find Mark guilty, the jury had to credit the
testimony of either Bryan or Lane Thomas, or both. What these witnesses lack in
credibility, they make up for in their willingness to testify falsely when the price is right.
Under the facts of the case, where the physical evidence could support convictions of
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either Bryan or Mark acting alone, 9 or both acting together, disclosing Mark's prior trial,
conviction, sentence and appeal in this same case, undoubtedly affected the outcome of
his trial. Under these circumstances, Mark's convictions must be vacated and his case
remanded for a new trial before a fair and impartial jury.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mark's Motion For A New Trial
Based On The Court's Violations Of Idaho Code Section I 9-2405, Idaho's New Trial
Statute
Mark maintains the district court abused its discretion by allowing prior testimony
to be read into the record, rather than requiring the State to produce the testimony anew,
and by telling jurors about his prior trial, conviction, sentence and appeals, all of which
were contrary to the plain language ofldaho's new trial statute. See LC. § l 9-2405. Mark
incorporates his prior arguments here by reference. (See Appellant's Br., pp.35-45.)
Idaho's new trial statute \,Vas adopted in 1864 and it unambiguously provides that
"[t]he granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been
had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict can not be used or
referred to either in evidence or in argument." LC. § 19-2405 (emphasis added). While
there is no specific evidence Idaho's new trial statute was borrowed from California, this

9As

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded when it granted Mark relief, whether
Mark or Bryan, individually or collectively, killed the Bravences is not decided by the
physical evidence.
Although there is overwhelming evidence that one or both of the Lankford
brothers killed the Bravences, only Bryan's testimony singled out Mark as
the killer. There were no witnesses to the murder, and no murder weapon
was admitted into evidence. There was no forensic or circumstantial
evidence suggesting that Mark, rather than Bryan, beat the victims to
death.

Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 586-87 (9th Cir. 2006).
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has acknowledged much of Idaho's territorial law was. 10 State v. Lundhigh, 30
Idaho 365, 1

P. 690, 691 (1917), overruled on other grounds

State v.

57

Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156, 160 (1937). Generally, when the Idaho Legislature borrows
another state's statute, this Court presumes it knew of the other state's existing
interpretations, and intended Idaho's interpretations to be the same. Doggett v.

Electronics Corp. of Am., Combustion Control Div., 93 Idaho 26, 29 (1969); State v.
Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454, 457 (1939) ("This court, in conformity with the
general rule, has held that a statute adopted from another state is usually, though not
conclusively, construed in accordance with the decisions of the courts of that state
rendered prior to its adoption herein if their interpretation is reasonable." (citations
omitted)).
The presumption of parity of interpretation does not apply when the borrowed
statute has yet to be interpreted by the lending state's highest court. As this Court
recognized in Lundhigh, the California Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute after
Idaho adopted the statute "might be persuasive, but would not be binding upon this
court." 164 P. at 691 (citation omitted). Nine years after Idaho adopted its new trial
statute, the California Supreme Court interpreted its own new trial statute for the first
time and concluded that "(t]o prove what a witness swore to on a former trial is
producing the testimony anew, and is not using or referring to the former verdict in any
sense." People v. Devine, 46 Cal. 45, 48 (1873). The California Supreme Court's

' 0Idaho

originally consisted of all of Idaho, Montana, and most of Wyoming. 2015 Idaho
House Concurrent Resolution No. 15, State Affairs Committee, 63 rd Legislature, first
regular session (recognizing Idaho's 125 th anniversary of statehood and the creation of
the territory of Idaho on March 4, 1863) (last accessed on September 21, 2015 at
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/ legislation/2015/HCR0 15 .pdf).
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interpretation of its own statute nearly a decade after Idaho borrowed it is

nominal

in deciding what Idaho's new trial statute means.
Nevertheless, the State argues the California Supreme Court's interpretation of its
own statute is the only proper way for this Court to interpret Idaho's statute; the State's
argument ignores contrary decisions in other jurisdictions, and ignores similar statutes
which allow for admission of prior testimony only because of explicit statutory language,
which Idaho's statute lacks. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Mazurek v. District Court {~{Twentieth

Judicial Dist., 22 P.3d 166, 169 (Mont. 2000) (recognizing that prior statutory language
requiring testimony to be produced anew would preclude use of testimony from an earlier
trial in a new trial of the same case); 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 95l(A) (Westlaw through
September 1, 2015) (explicitly providing that when a new trial is ordered, all "testimony
must be produced anew except of witnesses who are absent from the state or dead, in
which even the evidence of such witnesses on the former trial may be presented .... ").
Moreover, because Idaho adopted its new trial statute at a time when its territory included
Montana and most of Wyoming, the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of the same
statutory language, as cited above, which is consistent with Mark's reading of the statute,
is far more persuasive than that of the California Supreme Court.
The State then argues Mark's interpretation of section 19-2405 cannot be
reconciled with section 9-206, which provides that:
[t]he testimony of a witness who testified at the trial in an action or
proceeding in any district court of the State of Idaho . . . shall be
admissible at any subsequent trial between the same parties, and relating
to the same subject matter, when such witness is deceased, absent from the
state or otherwise unavailable or unable to testify as a witness.
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9-206.

State claims the conflict between the two statutes is irreconcilable,
to disregard the 1864 new

statute in

(Resp't Br., p.40.) The State similarly argues the new trial statute
conflicts with Rule 804(b )(1) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence (IRE), and must be
disregarded. (Resp't Br., pp.40-41.)
The statutes are not irreconcilable. Section 19-2405 is specific and narrow,
applying only to new trials in criminal cases, not civil cases. In contrast, section 9-206
purports to apply to testimony offered in any proceeding, trial or not, civil or criminal.
Because section 19-2405 is specific and section 9-206 is general, section I 9-2405
controls. See Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842 (1993) ("A specific statute, and by
analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls over a more general statute
when there is any conflict between the two or when the general statute is vague or
ambiguous."). Much like Idaho Code section 9-206, IRE 804(b) governs the admissibility
of prior testimony in any proceeding, not just trials and not just criminal cases. Thus, the
specific and narrow language of section 19-2405 controls over the general, broad
language of IRE 804(b )(1 ), which is virtually identical to Section 9-206.
The rights of an accused in a criminal case are greater than any party to a civil
lawsuit, and are constitutionally guaranteed. The federal constitution sets the floor of
constitutional rights, not the ceiling, and states are always free to provide greater
protections to its

O\\>TI

citizens. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.

74, 8 I (1980); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). Here, the Idaho Legislature
chose to provide criminal defendants with greater protections in criminal cases when a
new trial is granted through section 19-2405, which protects a defendant's constitutional
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to a

that is

of bias or prejudice stemming from knowledge

presumption of innocence, protects a defendant's

to compel

witnesses on his behalf and confront witnesses against him, and places the parties in the
same position they would have been had the first, defective trial not taken place.
Because the new trial statute is constitutionally based, and it is specific to criminal
cases, it cannot be overruled by court rule or a non-conflicting statute.

C.Y

Dickerson v.

United Stares, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) ("Afiranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),]
announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.").
Although this Court has never considered the new trial provision, it should give it the
deference it is entitled, having been part of our history since 1864.

IV.
The Prosecutor's Repeated References To And Elicitation Of Testimony Regarding
Mark's Prior Bad Acts, Prior Conviction. Death Sentence And Confinement On Death
Row Throughout The Trial, Repeatedly Calling Mark A Liar And Bolstering The State's
Own Witnesses' Testimony In Closing Argument, And His Suppression Of Evidence
Regarding Deals He Made For Snitch Testimony, Constitute Misconduct Entitling Mark
To A New Trial
Throughout Mark's trial, the prosecutor engaged m numerous instances of
misconduct, a majority of which Mark's attorneys did not object to. The prosecutor also
suppressed exculpatory evidence of deals he made in exchange for snitch testimony, and
elicited false testimony from the snitches at Mark's trial. These instances of misconduct
deprived Mark of his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial, requiring vacation
of his convictions and a remand for a new trial.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the touchstone of due
process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial,
not the culpability of the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). In
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addition, as this Court has long acknowledged, "[w]hile our system of criminal justice is
adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone
unturned, he is nevertheless expected and required to be fair." State v. Field, 144 Idaho
559, 571 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28 (1986) (citations
omitted)). Moreover, prosecutorial "appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through use of inflammatory tactics are impern1issible." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82,
86-87 (Ct. App. 2007).
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has
confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the
prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper
suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal
knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they
should properly carry none.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Prosecutors have unchecked discretion to decide who to prosecute, when to
prosecute, which crimes to prosecute, whether to make a plea offer, whether evidence is
subject to disclosure under Brady, and whether to seek a death sentence. They have at
their beck and call a standing army of investigators, process servers, and witnesses, their
ovvn crime lab, and virtually unlimited access to criminal databases, including NCIC,
CODIS (DNA) and fingerprint databases. What prosecutors possess in power and
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resources, they lack in oversight. When prosecutors abuse their powers and engage m
misconduct, it falls to the judiciary to hold them accountable.
For reasons similar to those this Court relied upon to reject the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in the Fourth Amendment context, this Court should
protect the rights of the accused to due process and a fair trial by adopting a similar rule
in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. When this Court rejected the Supreme
Court's adoption of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v.

Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984), it did so because Idaho's exclusionary rule was based on
more than just deterring police misconduct:
We believe that the exclusionary rule should be applied in order
to: 1) provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to
an unreasonable government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police
from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness
in the warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit an
additional constitutional violation by considering evidence which has been
obtained through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial integrity.

State v. Guzman. 122 Idaho 981, 993 ( 1992). Similar rationales compel this Court to: 1)
provide an effective remedy to persons whose due process and a fair trial rights have
been violated by prosecutorial misconduct; 2) deter prosecutors from acting unlawfully to
obtain convictions; 3) provide incentives for prosecutors to err on the side of
constitutional behavior; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit additional constitutional
violations by condoning prosecutorial misconduct; and 5) preserve judicial integrity,
which serves an important societal purpose.
[W]e are cognizant of the need to insure that the judiciary does function,
and is perceived as functioning, in a manner consistent with the individual
constitutional rights, both state and federal, of all \Vho appear before the
bar of justice. While the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is
undoubtedly to deter police misconduct, it is also true that at some point
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the courts must simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the
part of law enforcement agencies.
102 Idaho 387,391 (1981) (emphasis added).

V.

Similarly, Mark urges this Court to provide a remedy to individuals who are
deprived of their constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by prosecutorial
misconduct, and provide incentives for prosecutors to err on the side of constitutional
behavior, by resolving close questions involving misconduct in the defense's favor, not
the State's.
A.

Prosecutorial Misconduct During TriaL Eliciting Testimony Regarding The Prior
Case
Mark's prosecutor elicited testimony regarding Mark's prior trial, conviction,

sentence and appeals, which violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial, and which was in direct violation of the district court's pretrial orders. See State v.
Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The State disregards Mark's argument that the

prosecutor's misconduct violated his constitutional right to a fair trial, and claims because
the challenged testimony merely violated the district court's order, the misconduct, if
any, is a rule violation, not fundamental error. (Resp't Br., p.48.) Mark maintains his
prosecutors secured a verdict based on factors other than the law, 11 evidence properly
admitted at trial, 12 and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from that evidence. Id;

11 As

explained in Issue I, supra, the jury instructions in Mark's case permitted the jury to
find him guilty of felony murder (robbery), even if he had no intent to take the
Bravences' property prior to their deaths. The prosecutor exploited this defect, assuring
jurors that so long as Mark received the property while in Idaho, he was guilty of felony
murder.
12 Given Bryan's inherent unreliability, included his admissions that he committed perjury
on multiple occasions, the prosecutor's decision to present Bryan as a State's witness was
arguably itself a violation of his duty to ensure the jury receives only competent
evidence.
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see that the

reviewed a fair trial." (citations omitted)). In doing so, the prosecutor

violated Mark's constitutional right to a fair trial.

It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and
that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury. They should
not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon
the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the
rights of the accused."
Stale v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
As this Court has noted, "As public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure
that defendants receive fair trials." State v. Severson, I 4 7 Idaho 694, 715 (2009). Thus "a
prosecutor must 'guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and
tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.' A prosecutor must
also ensure that the jury receives only competent evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 9
Idaho 35, 44 (1903)). This duty cannot be shifted to defense counsel.
Petitioner's right to have the jury deliberate solely on the basis of the
evidence cannot be permitted to hinge upon a hope that defense counsel
will be a more effective advocate for that proposition than the prosecutor
will be in implying that extraneous circumstances may be considered. It
was the duty of the court to safeguard petitioner's rights, a duty only it
could have performed reliably.
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,489 (1978) (internal citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the dangers of prosecutorial
misconduct involving credibility vouching and expression of opinions about an accused's
guilt:
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such comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to
the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the
defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely
on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's
opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce
the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the
evidence.

UnitedStatesv. Young,470U.S. l, 18-19(1985)(citationomitted).
Here, prosecutors elicited testimony in the State's case-in-chief regarding Mark's
prior trial, 13 his prior crimes/bad acts, 14 his prior incarceration 15 and his prior death
sentence. 16 (Tr., p.1248, L.21

p.1249, L.3, p.1276, Ls.9-11, p.1288, Ls.22-24, p.1323,

13 The

prosecutor solicited testimony from Bryan, which either by the questions, or the
reasonable responses to the questions, produced objectionable information about Mark's
prior trial. (See, e.g., Tr., p.1329, Ls.6-7 ("And did you give this same story at Mark's
first trial?"); Tr., p.1323, Ls.11-17 (prosecutor asking whether Bryan had testified in
court and provided a different story about who was responsible for the Bravences' deaths,
and whether the testimony was offered at a trial or at a hearing)). Similarly, the
prosecutor asked Lane if Mark had told him what he was in for, if he had talked about the
charges, and what he said about them, to 'Which Lane replied, "He said he as in - he's
been on death row for 23 years for two murders, and that was committed in Grangeville."
(Tr., p.1248, L.21 p.1249, L.3.)
14 When the prosecutor questioned Bryan about Mark selling a camera to their brother,
Robert, and asked Bryan if he got any money from the sale, Bryan responded, "I didn't
know for sure that it was actually ever money transpired. I thought maybe he might
have just ultimately gave it to him for some drugs or something, because I remember
there was drugs involved in it." (Tr., p.1317, Ls.7-11.) The defense objected to this
statement and the court instructed jurors to disregard that "about the drugs." (Tr., p.1317,
Ls.14-16.) When asked by the prosecutor what he and Mark did once they got to Sheep
Creek Campground, Bryan responded, in part, "[U]ltimately I agreed to help be a
watchout because he had stolen cars before and I had never stolen a car so -." (Tr.,
p.1288, Ls.20-23.) Finally, when asked why he left Texas, Bryan explained he was afraid
of going to prison for a probation violation and "I was scared of prison because of what
Mark told me about prison, where he had been." (Tr., p.1276, Ls. 9-11.)
15 When Bryan testified he changed his story about his involvement in the Bravences'
deaths because he was afraid of being killed, the prosecutor asked him by who, Bryan
responded, "Oh, by the gang members or friends of Mark." (Tr., p.1324, Ls.3-12.) When
the prosecutor asked Bryan if he ever talked to Mark about any of the statements before
he made them, Bryan responded, "Oh, yes. We were on death row together for a long
time." (Tr., p.1325, Ls.1-6.)
16See supra nn.13-15.
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1-6, p.1

18-23, p.1328, L.24

p.1

The State tries

Ls.3-10,

1325,

to

itself from the improper testimony, claiming because it was volunteered by its

witnesses, but not specifically sought by the prosecutor, the testimony did not constitute
prosecutorial misconduct.
Although the State cites to some cases outside of Idaho for support (Resp't Br.,
p.49), none are compelling. Two are federal district court decisions where the court was
asked to decide whether state court findings of no prosecutorial misconduct were contrary
to Supreme Court precedent or wholly unreasonable. See Gonzales v. Rapelje, 2015 WL
1534489, *9, *13 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (upholding state court's finding of no misconduct
where petitioner volunteered information about the nature of his prior felony conviction
during cross-examination by prosecutor, despite parties' stipulation to exclude such
evidence): Ahmed v. Gibson, 2013 WL 5487033 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (holding where jury
knew of defendant's and witness's methamphetamine use, and witness's prior
convictions, witness's volunteered testimony that defendant had been in prison and had
beaten her, was not prejudicial; trial court struck abuse testimony and jury acquitted
defendant of attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter, convicting him
only of assault with a firearm).
The State also cites United States v. Tetioukhine, 725 F.3d I, 10 (1 st Cir. 2013), 17
arguing that the court recognized a difference between volunteered testimony and that
which is directly elicited. Actually, Tetioukhine addressed the question of whether a
defendant's false direct testimony opened the door to cross-examination about the

17The

State erroneously cites this case as "752 F.3d 1, 10 (1 st Cir. 2013)." (Resp't Br.,

p.49.)

27

circumstances under which he left his jewelry store job. Id at *9-* 10. The Court found it

Id at * 10.
Finally.

two state cases cited by the

one considered the

whether a witness's improper testimony evidenced an intent by the prosecutor to provoke
a mistrial, which would have then triggered double jeopardy protections and precluded
retrial. State v. Santiago, 928 So. 3d 480, 481 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The other
case addressed whether the district court properly denied the defendant's motion for a
mistrial based on a single statement by a police officer about the defendant's prior
criminal history and incarceration. Moore v. State, 64 So. 3d 542, 546 (Miss. Ct. App.
2011 ). Counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial; the district court denied
the motion, but instructed jurors to disregard the statement. Id. On appeal, the court
upheld the denial of the mistrial, finding because the statement ,vas not elicited by the
prosecutor but was volunteered by the officer, there was no misconduct. Id. This
conclusion is contrary to this Court's decision in State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 67
(2011).
In Ellington, this Court recognized that a police officer's "gratuitous and
prejudicial response is imputed to the State, whether or not the State intended to elicit that
response." Id. The State acknowledges Ellington, but only by footnote, arguing it does
not apply because "(Lane] Thomas obviously was not a law enforcement officer."
(Resp't. Br., p.49, n.8.) The State fails to address Bryan's improper testimony, or explain
how it is not attributable to the State.
A prosecutor has an obligation to inform state witnesses "of any subjects
improper for testimony so that the witnesses may avoid violating an order in limine."
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State v. Witrsell, 66 P.3d 831,839 (Kan. 2003); see also State v. Riley, 796
misconduct

.W.2d 371,
to

to

its witness to refrain from mentioning a polygraph exam, and even though the
witness testified about the polygraph on cross-examination by the defense, "it was the
responsibility of the State to instruct [its witness] on his obligation to comply with the
order in limine"). Moreover, even in the absence of such an order, a prosecutor has a duty
to guard against testimony containing inadmissible evidence. Lamb v. State, 251 P.23d
700, 708 (Nev. 2011); People v. Warren, 754 P.2d 218, 224-25 (Cal. 1988). As the
Kansas Supreme Court has recognized:
Intrinsically, violations of orders in limine have a prejudicial effect
because the requisite for obtaining such orders is showing that the mere
offer or reference to the excluded evidence would tend to be prejudicial.
The primary purpose of an order in limine, after all, is to prevent prejudice
during trial.
The importance of compliance with orders in limine has been underscored
by our caselaw imposing a duty on prosecutors to instruct their witnesses
about the existence and contents of such orders as a guard against
improper testimony.
State v. Santos-Vega, 321 P.3d 1, 11 (Kan. 2014) (citations omitted). Similarly, as this
Court recognized in State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 144-45 (2014), \Vhen a prosecutor
questions his own witnesses in a way which conveys inadmissible evidence to the jury,
he commits misconduct. Specifically, a prosecutor commits misconduct when he attempts
to skirt an order in limine through direct questioning of his own witness "by giving the
jury more than enough information to easily infer the content of the [inadmissible
evidence]." Id.
The prosecutor in Mark's case had a duty to infom1 both Lane and Bryan of the
district court's order excluding evidence of Mark's prior trial, prior incarceration, prior
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death sentence, prior bad acts, and prior appeals. In addition, the prosecutor had a duty to
the admission

improper testimony. It does not appear the prosecutor did

these things.
Mark acknowledges Bryan and Lane are not and were not law enforcement
officers when they testified against him. Nevertheless, both Bryan and Lane testified for
the State, at the State's request, and in exchange for that testimony, they received
personal benefits. Because snitches and their incentivized testimony are so integrally
intertwined with prosecutors, unlike regular lay witnesses vvho receive nothing for their
testimony, snitches are agents of the State and are more like law enforcement officers
than lay witnesses.
Bryan's incentive to testify for the State and say Mark killed the Bravences, not
him, was significant: a chance at freedom. 18 Lane's incentives were equally great:
freedom and cold, hard cash. 19 Because of the special relationship the prosecutor had

18 In

exchange for his testimony, Bryan got a parole hearing seven years earlier than
scheduled; he got testimony from a prosecutor and a police detective at his parole hearing
about his assistance and cooperation in Mark's case; a name change; an agreement that he
be relocated; a cellphone to keep with him, in his cell, so he could make unrecorded,
unmonitored calls to his wife, friends, and family members; a prosecutor who facilitated
communications between Bryan and his wife, as well as a State's witness; and, an
agreement that he would not be prosecuted for prior perjury.
19 Lane pied guilty to felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and was
sentenced to serve three years, with 18 months fixed, on December 10, 2007, the district
court retained jurisdiction for 180 days and set a review hearing for May 12, 2008. (Supp.
R., pp.251-53.) In exchange for his "truthful" testimony against Mark, Lane received
immunity from prosecution for his past false statements (7 /29/13 E.H. Tr., p. 72, L.18 p.73, L.23); he was released almost three months early from prison (Supp. R., pp.262-63)
and placed on probation (Supp. R., pp.264-65, 693-700); as an added bonus, he got
$1,500 in cash upon his release from jail. Lane's testimony later secured him three get
out of jail free passes when he violated his probation on three different occasions. (8/5/13
E.H. Tr., p.261, L.6 - p.264, L.13; Supp. R., pp.751-57 (Defs E.H. Ex.CC).) By the
fourth violation, the prosecutor finally refused to help Lane evade prison. (8/15/13 Tr.,
p.264, Ls.14-25.)
30

Bryan and

and the benefits they received in exchange for

against Mark, their incentivized testimony is attributable to the prosecutor
of Ellington, whether solicited or not. If prosecutors are not accountable

testimony
the logic
their agents'

improper testimony, and convictions are not vacated when prosecutors either actively
elicit, or passively refuse to prevent improper testimony, prosecutors will have incentive
to disregard their constitutional and ethical obligations. As Judge Alex Kozinski observed
in the context of Brady violations, which he characterized as having reached "epidemic
proportions" in recent years:
When a public official behaves with such casual disregard for his
constitutional obligations and the rights of the accused, it erodes the
public's trust in our justice system, and chips away at the foundational
premises of the rule of law. When such transgressions are acknowledged
yet forgiven by the courts, we enforce and invite their repetition.

United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631-32 (9 th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from order denying petition for rehearing en bane); accord Stare v. Phillips, I 44 Idaho
82, 89 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Although circumstances may arise, particularly if there is a
pattern of repetitious misconduct by an individual prosecutor or a particular prosecutor's
office, that would call for reversal ... despite the harmlessness of the error, we need not
decide that question today .... ").
The improper testimony offered through the State's snitches was highly
prejudicial, it deprived Mark of his presumption of innocence, relieved the State of its

Despite alleged concerns about risks to Lane's life or safety because of his
testimony against Mark, there is no evidence Lane was harmed while serving out the
remainder of his prison sentence. Lane completed his sentence and was discharged from
IDOC custody on January 1, 2012. (See IDOC Offender Search, Lane Franklin Thomas,
IDOC no. 87733 at https://vvvvw.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/result,
last accessed September 22, 2015.) According to Prosecutor Thompson, Lane's sentence
topped out in January of 2012. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.71, Ls.13-25.)
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burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and deprived him of his right to a
fair trial before an impartial jury. The testimony represents an attempt to secure a guilty
verdict based on factors other than admissible evidence and the law. For these reasons,
the misconduct committed by the prosecutor in Mark's case \Varrants a new trial.
Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Argument

B,

Throughout closing argument, the prosecutor called Mark a liar, told jurors Mark
lied when he testified under oath, and then vouched for the truthfulness of State
witnesses. The State minimizes the misconduct and claims to not know the difference
between misconduct vvhere the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of his witnesses,
and misconduct where the prosecutor called Mark a liar and accused him of perjury. 20 To
help the State recognize the difference between these types of misconduct, Mark notes
the following instances of prosecutorial misconduct involve improper vouching, while
the remaining misconduct identified at pages 50-52 of his Appellant's Brief, involve the
prosecutor calling Mark a liar and/or a perjurer:
•

•
•

''Darrell Cox had no reason to make that up. He had no reason to lie today.
lie was inconvenienced, I'm sure, to come in and be a witness in this case,
but he told the truth." (Tr., p.1816, Ls.7-10 (emphasis added).)
·'We've shown you good people that have come up and been honest." (Tr.,
p.1820, Ls.6-8.)
"Lane Thomas, basically with his life on the line, came in and testified
in front of you. He had no reason to lie. He did not get a plea bargain
from the State. The only thing that we agreed to do was write a letter of

20 The

prosecutor's misconduct in closing argument, telling jurors Mark lied to them
during his testimony (committed perjury), include: (1) "So he lied to you on the stand
when he talked about the kind of money he had when he left Texas and when he came
back from Texas." (Tr., p.1817, Ls.11-14); (2) "Mark Lankford testified in this case, and
there was [sic] many lies that he told you." (Tr., p.1815, Ls.18-19); and (3) "I find it
strange that these people he allegedly says gave him an alibi defense have never been
found .... I submit that there is nobody that gave him a ride, and that that's a made-up
story. That's another of his lies." (Tr., p.1835, Ls.1-16).
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•

•

cooperation that if he testified I would vvrite a letter saying he came in and
told the truth. And that I would send that to
Judge on his case
to
facility in Cottonwood where
what they
1
1-10 (emphasis added).)
overwhelming evidence is, one, the testimony of Lane Thomas that
puts Mark Lankford there. A credible person that puts him there. Mark
Lankford's confession to him." (Tr., p.1833, Ls.14-18 (emphasis added).)
'Td ask you to think about Lane Thomas' testimony. I think we had a
person there that didn't want to be here. He said he said he didn't want
to be here. He said that his life had been threatened by Mr. Lankford and
that his life had been hell since he got involved in this case. Yet, even
facing that he came in and testified for nothing, nothing except a
letter. And I submit he told the truth about Mark Lankford's confession
to him. about him being there with Bryan Lankford and participating in
these murders." (Tr., p.1839, Ls.9-18 (emphasis added).)
Prosecutors commit misconduct in closing argument when they make comments

"so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be
disregarded." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003) (quoting State v. Cortez, 135
Idaho 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001)). This Court has acknowledged a prosecutor cannot
express his personal belief about a witness's credibility in closing argument, unless the
argument is based solely on inferences from the trial evidence. State v. Dunlap, 155
Idaho 345, 369 (2013). A "prosecuting attorney may express an opinion in argument as to
the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such opinion is based
upon the evidence," but "when such a comment is contemplated the prosecutor should
exercise caution to avoid interjecting his personal belief and should explicitly state that
the opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial." State v.

Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 753 n. l (1991 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121
Idaho 425, 432 (1991 ). Prosecutors should avoid statements of opinion, including "I
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think" and "I believe" altogether. State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho l

131 (Ct App.

1986).
Despite

overwhelming volume of misconduct, the State

the prosecutors

did not vouch for their own witnesses, and did not improperly call Mark a liar, but simply
commented on the evidence in closing argument. (Resp't Br., pp.55-59.) And even if the
prosecutor did commit misconduct, and the misconduct violated Mark's constitutional
rights, the State claims Mark's attorneys could have had a strategic reason for not
objecting. 21 Given the prejudicial nature of the repeated misconduct, even if Mark's
attorneys could identify a strategic reason for failing to object, it would be objectively
unreasonable and unworthy of this Court's deference.
Finally, the State retreats to its standard response: the evidence of Mark's guilt
was overwhelming, thus rendering the misconduct harmless. The State fails to identify
the overwhelming evidence of Mark's guilt upon which its argument rests because it
cannot; there is no overwhelming evidence of Mark's guilt. "Where the issue of guilt is
debatable or it appears from the record that the jurors could have reasonably entertained
doubt as to the defendant's guilt and that misconduct of the prosecuting attorney might
well have influenced the result, a conviction will be reversed." State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho
173, 184 (1953).
No instruction from the district court could undo the volume of misconduct in
closing argument. The State asked jurors to convict Mark not because the admissible
evidence of his guilt was strong-it was not-but by inflaming jurors' passions against

If the State claims the strategic basis was defense counsels' reluctance to object during
closing argument, it is sorely mistaken. Defense counsel repeatedly objected during the
prosecutor's closing argument. (See Tr., p.1822, Ls.3, 7, 12, p.1831, L.17, p.1835, L.19.)
21
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him and appealing to their emotions by characterizing him as a liar and a perjurer, while
characterizing its own

including the most

unreliable ones, as saints.
The prosecutor and defense "have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully,
from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be
drmvn therefrom." Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969. Despite this
wide latitude, "appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible." State v. Ellington,
151 Idaho 53, 62,253 P.3d 727, 736 (2011) (quoting State v. Phillips. 144
Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007)). The Court has
recognized, however, that "[t]he line separating acceptable from improper
advocacy is not easily drawn; there is often a gray zone." State v. Carson,
151 Idaho 713,721,264 P.3d 54, 62 (2011). "[P]rosecutorial misconduct
during closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court
informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded." Sheahan,
139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Cortez, 135 Idaho 561,565, 21 P.3d 498,502 (Ct. App. 2001)).
State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 (2014); see also State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 184
( 1953) ("Where the issue of guilt is debatable or it appears from the record that the jurors
could have reasonably entertained doubt as to the defendant's guilt and that misconduct of
the prosecuting attorney might well have influenced the result a conviction will be
reversed." (citations omitted)).
To suggest the prosecutor was simply pointing out inconsistencies between
Mark's testimony and that of other witnesses, or just commenting on the strength of the
defense's evidence (Resp't Br., p.59), is absurd. The prosecutor engaged in misconduct to
secure a conviction in a case with nominal evidence of guilt; the prejudice resulting from
that misconduct could not have remedied by instructions from the court advising jurors to
disregard it.
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Prosecutorial Misconduct In Rebuttal Closing Argument
proceedings,

State sought information regarding Mark's alibi.

expressed frustration about providing this information, telling the State
and the district court that "one of the problems I'm having is I don't know exactly when
the Bravences were killed, and if the State could tell me exactly when that happened then
I might be able to say, number one." (1/10/08 Hrg. Tr., p.191, Ls.5-9.) In response,
prosecutor MacGregor represented to the court and defense counsel, "And, Your Honor,
we do know basically that the murders occurred around dark, around 9: 15, 9:00 in the
evening .... On June 21st, 1983." (Id, p.192, Ls.17-21.) Prosecutor Albers also chimed in:
"About 9: 15, longest day of the year at approximately 9: 15 just at dark, June 21

st

1983."

(Id, p.192, Ls.24-25.) The trial court and defense counsel accepted the prosecutors at

their word. (Id., p.193, Ls.1-3.)
At no point during the trial, or during closing argument, did prosecutors
backpedal from the time of the Bravences' deaths. Instead, prosecutor Albers waited until
rebuttal closing argument, when Mark had no ability to respond, to move the Bravences'
time of death from 9:00 or 9: 15, to 8:30 p.m. (Tr., p.1877, Ls.1-4 ("In order for the
Lankfords to get to Pendleton, ... the deaths have to occur about 8:30.").) The prosecutor
then summarized Bryan's story of the evening of June 21 51, and contrasted it with Mark's
testimony, arguing because the Bravences died at 8:30 p.m., and Bryan's story was
consistent with that timeframe but Mark's was not, Bryan was telling the truth. (Tr.,
p.1877, L.1 - p.1879, L.12.) Defense counsel objected: "Your Honor, I'm going to
object. They asked an [sic] abili defense at 9: 15 p.m. that night and they are getting up
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and argumg that it was at 8:30." (Tr., p.1879, Ls.13-15.) The court overruled the
objection. (Tr.,

1879, L.16.)

It is improper to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in
closing argument. Rothwell, 154 Idaho at 133, 294 P.3d at 1145. Indeed,
the prosecutor "has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts and
unnecessarily inflammatory tactics." State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166,
610 P.2d 522, 525 (1980) (overruled on other grounds by State v. LePage,
102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981)). Here, the prosecutor fell short of
that standard by claiming, without qualification that Branam could not
"get in trouble" for his testimony at Moses' preliminary hearing. The
immunity agreement is clear that Branam could be prosecuted for false
testimony; claiming otherwise was a misrepresentation.
State v. 1\lfoses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014). Because counsel objected to the misconduct,

the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the misconduct did not contribute to the
jury's verdict. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28 (2010).
The State argues prosecutors were not bound by their pretrial representations
regarding the victims' time of death, and because the new time of death could be
supported by evidence elicited at trial, there was no misconduct and no due process
violation. (Resp't Br., pp.62-63.) Although this Court has not specifically addressed the
misconduct at issue here, it has recognized the State violates due process when it argues
inconsistent theories at the core of its case against two or more defendants accused of the
same crime. State v. Payne, l 46 Idaho 548, 566 (2008) (citations omitted). Moreover, this
Court has recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents parties from assuming
inconsistent positions in the same case.

If parties in court were permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the
trial of their causes, the usefulness of courts of justice would in most cases
be paralyzed; the coercive process of the law, available only between
those who consented to its exercise, could be set at naught by all. But the
rights of all men, honest and dishonest, are in the keeping of the courts,
and consistency of proceeding is therefore required of all those who come
or are brought before them. It may accordingly be laid down as a broad
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proposition that one who, without mistake induced by the opposite party,
has taken a particular position deliberately in the course of litigation, must
act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and loose.
TVinmark v. Miles & Stockbridge, 674 A.2d 73, 79-80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(additional citation omitted)22 (quoted with approval in ,McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,
153 (1997)). As this Court noted in }\1cKay, "Judicial estoppel is meant to prevent taking
inconsistent positions, whether legal or factual, at least absent newly discovered evidence

or fraud." 130 Idaho at 155. Neither newly discovered evidence nor fraud justify the
State's inconsistent factual positions.
The State fails to explain how the prosecutor taking inconsistent factual positions
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument
stated, as fact, that the victims were killed at 8:30 p.m., a half-hour to 45 minutes earlier
than prosecutors represented to the court and defense counsel. When prosecutors
represented to the defense and the trial court that the victims died at 9:00 p.m. or 9: 15
p.m., it did so to obtain specific alibi information from the defense. When prosecutors
changed the time of the victims' deaths in rebuttal closing argument, it did so to support
Bryan's testimony, which was necessary to try to convince jurors to believe the State's
case (i.e., Bryan's version of events), while casting doubt on Mark's testimony.
(Compare Tr., p.1287, L.4 -p.1306, L.10 with Tr., p.1594, L.19- p.1623, L.23.) In both
instances, the State had something to gain from taking inconsistent positions. Because
this case is truly a matter of they said versus he said, Lan¾ford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578,

22 The

Winmark decision was vacated by the Maryland Court of Appeals, which found the
Court of Special Appeals erroneously applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See
WinA1ark Ltd. Partnership v. livfiles & Stockbridge, 693 A.2d 824, 831 (Md. Ct. App.
1997) (holding Court of Special Appeals improperly applied judicial estoppel against the
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Cir. 2006) (observing that the corroborative evidence in Mark's case implicates

the Lankfords generally, not Mark specifically, and there is no unique evidence that
points to

rather than Bryan, as the perpetrator), absent the State's

misconduct, "honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty
verdicts.'' Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967). Thus, Mark's convictions
and sentence must be vacated, and his case remanded for a new trial because the State
cannot prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's misconduct did not
contribute to his convictions.

D.

Prosecutorial Misconduct For Bradv23 And Napue 2 -1 Violations
The prosecutors below engaged in serious misconduct which violated Mark's

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The State gained its convictions against Mark
by suppressing material, exculpatory evidence about deals it made in exchange for snitch
testimony, 25 and by presenting testimony it knew to be false. On appeal, the State

petitioners, vacating judgment and remanding the matter to the Court of Special Appeals
for further consideration).
23 Brady v. Maryland, 3 73 U.S. 83 (1963 ).
2\Vapue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
25 The dangers associated with snitch testimony are obvious but bear repeating. As Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' Judge Stephen Trott has explained on multiple occasions:
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims
another prisoner has confessed to him. The snitch now stands ready to
testify in return for some consideration in his own case. Sometimes these
snitches tell the truth, but more often they invent testimony and stray
details out of the air: In the seamy world of jailhouse informers, treachery
has long been their credo and favors from jailers their reward.
Honorable Stephen S. Trott, Word-; of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as
Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 1381, 1394 (1996); see also Russell Covey,
Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 WAKE FOREST LAW REV. 1375 (2014)
(arguing for a complete ban on jailhouse snitch testimony absent corroboration through
recording of any alleged confession/admission by a defendant, because: (1) such
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incorrectly claims that when denying Mark's motion for a new trial, the court found no
violations occmTed, and further claims Mark has failed to show either a Brady or
arguments regarding the State's Brady and Napue violations,
including applicable case law, are set forth in his Appellant's Brief and incorporated here

(See Appellant's Br., pp. 54-72.)
1.

Lane's Undisclosed Deal With The State And His False Testimony26

When Lane testified for the State on February 8, 2008, he declared he was "pretty
close" to finishing the sixth month rider program. 27 (Tr., p.1246, Ls.4-15.) This was a lie.
Lane started the program on December 26, 2007; by the time he testified, he was only
about six weeks into the six month program, not "pretty close" to finishing. 28 (Supp. R.,
pp.251-53 (Defendant's E.H. Ex.S).) Lane also testified he did not receive a plea bargain
for his testimony, and the prosecutor's office "did nothing to get me here to testify." (Tr.,

testimony is so inherently biased; (2) the temptations faced by inmates to commit perjury
arc overwhelming; (3) jurors are inclined to give snitch testimony more value than it is
worthy of; and (4) current devices, like cross-examination and post-conviction relief, are
ineffective in ferreting out unreliable informant testimony); Northwestern University
School of Law, Center on Wrongful Convictions, The Snitch System: How Snitch
Testimony Sent Randy Steidl and Other Innocent Americans to Death Row (Winter 20042005) (documenting how incentivized testimony of jailhouse witnesses who were
promised leniency in their own cases, or killers with incentive to cast suspicions away
from themselves, contributed to 45.9% of the 111 death row exonerations to date) (last
accessed at http://vvww.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/SnitchSystem
Booklet.pdf on September 18, 2015)).
26 Incredibly, the State tries to argue Mark's claim is limited to the State's failure to tell
the defense about its agreement to help Lane get out of prison and on probation. (Resp't
Br., p.66, n.9.) The State's argument is belied by Mark's Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's
Br., pp.58-66.)
27 The prosecutor asked Lane, "Okay, and you're serving six months over there?" Lane
responded, "Yes, sir." The prosecutor then asked, "Are you about done with that
firogram?" Lane responded, "Pretty close, sir." (Tr., p.1246, Ls.11-15.)
8That is, unless the prosecutors in Mark's case told Lane they had reached an agreement
with prosecutor Thompson in Latah County to secure his release from prison upon
Mark's conviction.
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p.1254, Ls.16-21.) This was also a lie. Lane later admitted that in exchange for his
testimony, the prosecutor's office would write a letter of cooperation to the prison telling
them he had testified truthfully, and had cooperated in the investigation of Mark's case.
(Tr., p.1257, Ls.4-22.) Even this was a lie by omission. The prosecutor also promised to
grant Lane immunity from prosecution for his prior statements, and also promised to try
to get Lane out of prison and placed on probation. 29 Lane also testified the prosecutor did
not offer him anything, including the letter of cooperation, until the day before he
testified. (Tr., p.1262, L.14 - p.1263, L.17.) This is also a lie. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.32,
L.15-p.33, L.17, p.68, L.12-p.69, L.4, p.70, L.6 -p.72, L.24; 8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.240,
L.22 - p.244, L.12.)
Finally, Lane was asked if, other than the promised letter of cooperation, there

was any other reason that he was testifying against Mark. (Tr., p.1259, Ls.20-22.) Lane
responded, "There's no reason but just being honest." (Tr., p.1259, L.23.) This was also a
lie. The prosecutor promised that he would talk to Lane's prosecutor (in fact, he already
had talked to Lane's prosecutor a month or so prior to Mark's trial) and judge, try to get
Lane out of prison early and placed on probation, and grant him immunity from
prosecution for his prior false statements. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p. 241, L.4 - p.242, L.9,
p.244, L.6 - p.245, L.19, p.248, L.2 - p.249, L.5, p.249, Ls.17-19.) Moreover, upon
Lane's early release from prison, Skott Mealer, the lead detective on Mark's case (id,
p.183, Ls.11-14), cashed a $1,500 check from Idaho County payable to him, and then

29 Lane

testified that he hoped to be placed on probation after the rider, not during. (Tr.,
p.1260, L 4 -p.1261, L.4.)
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clandestinely passed the $1,500 cash to Lane 30 behind a car wash, in a manner more
befitting of a drug deal 31 than legitimate State business.
Despite contrary testimony from State witnesses,32 the district court below
concluded Lane was paid $1,500 not for travel expenses, but "in the same manner that
sums are paid to informants." (Supp. R., p.903.) In addition, the court concluded Lane's

30The

State maintains that if there was no agreement to pay Lane prior to trial, "that's not
a Brady violation. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.154, Ls.23-25, p.155, Ls.3-7.) All inducements to
testify, including the wink and the nod of implied future benefits not reduced to a formal
agreement, are subject to disclosure under Brady. See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words
Of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, And The Problem Ollmplied Inducements, 98
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1129,passim (Spring 2004).
31 Detective Mealer testified he got a radio or phone call on the morning of March 3,
2008, from an unknown person (8/5/14 E.H. Tr., p.172, Ls.8-19), telling him to go to the
Idaho County Courthouse to meet with County Commission Doman about a check for
Lane. (Id, p.168, L.10
p.170, L.7.) Detective Mealer immediately went to the
courthouse and got a check for $1,500 from Commissioner Doman. (Id., p.170, L. 7 p.171, L.23.) Detective Mealer testified that when he paid informants, he typically paid
them in cash. (Id., p.173, Ls.2-20.) Detective Mealer testified "[s]omebody had told me to
to meet him [Lane] up on 21 st by a a car wash behind, I want to say, Rosauers. But,
again, I don't - I don't recall that. But I did meet him, and it was by a car wash up on 2 I st
Street later that day." (Id., p.174, Ls.2-7.) As soon as he cashed the check, he
immediately drove his county vehicle to Lewiston, where he met Lane "behind a car
wash in - on 21 st Street." (Id., p.175, Ls.2-13, p.178, Ls.3-4.) Lane testified he was told
by Detective Mealer to meet the detective behind the car wash on 21 st in Lewiston after
he got out of jail. (8/6/13 E.H. Tr., p.428, Ls.8-18.)
32 Dennis Albers, the lead prosecutor against Mark and Bryan Lankford in 1983-1984,
was the deputy prosecutor in Mark's 2008 trial. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.7, Ls.5-21.) He
testified the $1,500 was travel money for Lane to get out of town and go to Texas. (Id,
p.35, L.21 -p.37, L.12, p.41, Ls.4-7, p.56, L.23 -p.57, L.18.) Prosecutor Albers thought
the amount was too high for travel, but "it was probably reasonable in view of the benefit
that he had been to the State and to get him away from Mark Lankford." (Id., p.45, Ls.16, 14-21.) Latah County Prosecutor Bill Thompson also testified about the $1,500.
Thompson testified Lane's Latah County case was set for an early review hearing on
February 29, 2009. (7/29/13 E.H.Tr., p.63, L.11 - p.65, L. 1.) At that hearing, Lane was
released from prison and placed on probation; it was contemplated that he would go to
Texas and be on unsupervised probation. (Id, p.65, Ls.6-13.) Thompson testified the
$1,500 payment was discussed at the hearing, and that McGregor and Albers were going
to ask their commissioners to give Lane $1500 to defray costs ofrelocating to Texas. (Id.,
p.76, Ls.9 -21.)
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trial testimony regarding the benefits he got for testifying against Mark was not false, but
the prosecutor did not tell the defense about its agreement to try to
pnson

Lane out of

(Supp. R., pp.901-902.) Both cannot be true.
Rather than acknowledging the failures of its brethren to meet their constitutional

obligations, the State defends the prosecutors' nondisclosure, and minimizes the import
of the undisclosed evidence, characterizing it as cumulative impeachment and nothing
more than "minute details." (Resp't Br., pp.70-71.) Additionally, the State claims Lane
"was forced to endure" extensive impeachment through cross-examination, and therefore,
even if he did testify falsely, the false testimony was cumulative because he \Vas so
extensively impeached. (Id., p.72.) It is unclear which cross-examination the State relies
on for this statement, as it cites none; given the limited cross-examination and
impeachment of Lane at Mark's trial, it cannot be this case. (See Tr., p.1260, L.4 p.1270, L.24.)
Lane testified the prosecutor's letter of cooperation, the State's agreement not to
prosecute him for perjury for his prior statements, and because he was just being honest,
were his only inducements to testify against Mark. What the jury did not hear was that
Mark's prosecutors had met with Lane's prosecutor a month before Mark's trial and had
already made arrangements for Lane to get released from prison, so long as his testimony
inculpated Mark. The jury also did not hear that once Mark was convicted, the
prosecutors were going to get Lane out of prison three months early, on unsupervised
probation. Jurors also did not know that Lane got $1,500 in cash for his testimony. The
reason the jury did not know this information is because the prosecutor allowed Lane's
false testimony regarding the scope of the prosecutor's agreement with him to go
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the prosecutor failed to tell the defense about all the benefits it

uncorrected,

his testimony.
State's

to minimize the benefits Lane received

for

testimony and the impact that information would have had on Lane's credibility before
the jury, had the State disclosed it, is unavailing, The suppression of the prosecutor's deal
with Lane to testify against Mark, and the prosecutor's decision to allow Lane's false
testimony about that deal to go uncorrected, left the jury not only with incomplete
information upon which to judge Lane's credibility and the credibility of his story about
Mark's alleged confession to him, but false information about Lane's deal with the
prosecutor and incentive to testify.
2.

Prosecution's Undisclosed Deal With Brvan And Elicitation Of False
Testimonv

Bryan is a professional perjurer. By his o,vn admissions, he lies under oath in
open court, and he lies in sworn statements and affidavits filed with the courts. Bryan lies
to get what he wants. His perjured testimony in Mark's trial, followed by yet another
recantation, is unremarkable and should come as no surprise to anyone who knows him,
or knows of him. However, Bryan's penchant for perjury may not be as obvious to jurors
who have no prior involvement with him; they may have accepted his explanations for
his past history of perjury and false statements. As a result, evidence of Bryan's
willingness to lie, if only by omission, about benefits he received from the prosecutor for
his testimony, was important evidence of Bryan's continued willingness to lie and
commit perjury when it suits his needs.
At Mark's trial, Bryan testified about the deals he was getting in exchange for his
testimony, which were numerous; however, he failed to mention having a cell phone in
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his jail cell, and to having prosecutor MacGregor at his disposal to facilitate
him and his brother,
prosecutor allowed the omissions to go uncorrected, even though the
had walked Bryan through every other benefit the State had given him to
testify against Mark when Bryan was struggling to remember them all. (Tr., p.1329, L.21
- p.1335, L.18.) The prosecutor stated, in his questioning of Bryan, "Do you remember if
- just want to make sure we get all these conditions down

regarding what you've been

offored by the Prosecutor." (Tr., p.1334, Ls.21-23.) After Bryan admitted to additional
promises for his testimony, the prosecutor asked, "Is there any other reasons why you're
testifying today?" (Id, p.1336, Ls.4-5.) When Bryan responded, "Absolutely," the
prosecutor asked "[a]ny personal reasons?" (Id, p.1336, L.7.) When Bryan began to offer
his inadmissible opinion, the defense objected and the objection was sustained. (Id.,
p.1336, Ls.9-14.) The prosecutor said he was finished questioning Bryan, but never asked
him about the rest of the benefits the State gave him for testifying. The State ignores the
Napue violations resulting from the prosecutor's elicitation of incomplete testimony from

Bryan about the benefits he received for his testimony, knowing that its incomplete
nature rendered it false, if only by omission.

33 The

district court concluded Bryan's failure to reveal the prosecutor provided him with
access to a cellphone during his testimony about benefits he was receiving in exchange
for his testimony was not perjured because '·Bryan was never asked about such access nor
asked generally about any jail house privileges." (Supp. R., p.910.) This view toward
suppressed exculpatory evidence has been disavowed by the United States Supreme
Court: "A rule thus declaring 'prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable
in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process." Banks v. Dretke,
540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004). The court did not address the prosecutor's facilitation of
pretrial communications between Bryan and Lee John, or communications between
Bryan and his wife, Francoise.
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the State focuses on the Brady violation stemming from prosecutors'
failure to

defense counsel that it facilitated Bryan
to

during Mark's

35

and

a cellphone

he was in

failing to tell defense counsel that it

facilitated communications between Bryan and another State's witness, as well as his
,vife. 36 The State claims that this suppressed evidence was not material because the jury

was already a,vare of Bryan's history of false statements and perjury, and even if the
communications were additional consideration for his testimony, they "would have been
nothing more than a feather laid upon a stack of bricks that had already repeatedly
challenged every aspect of his retrial testimony." (Resp't Br., p.75.) The State's argument
is essentially that Bryan's lack of credibility excused it from its constitutional obligation
to disclose exculpatory evidence. That is, no matter how great the undisclosed
impeachment evidence was, it was in-elevant because nothing could diminish Bryan's
credibility further. This is the same conclusion the district court reached in rejecting
Mark's motion for a new trial. (Supp. R., p.912.)
While the State downplays the relevance and significant of Bryan's possession of
a cellphone in his jail cell for the 3-4 months prior to and during Mark's trial, it is worth
noting that Idaho law now makes the unauthorized or unlawful possession of a cellphone

34 Detective

Mealer testified prosecutor MacGregor asked him to get Bryan a cellphone
while he was in the county jail. (E.H. Tr., p.188, L.11 - p.189, L.4, p.194, L.25 p.195,
L2.)
35 The district court concluded the State suppressed this evidence below in violation of
Brady, (Supp. R., pp.911-12.)
36 Lee John is Mark's and Bryan's brother. Lee John testified for the State against Mark
and corroborated aspects of Bryan's testimony regarding a purple club Mark owned and
which Bryan claimed Mark used to assault the Bravences. (Tr., p.1500, L.8 - p.1521,
L. 13.) The fact that the prosecutor facilitated communications between Bryan and Lee
John prior to trial would have been devastating to Lee John's testimony, Bryan's
testimony and the prosecutor's credibility before the jury.
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in a jail or other correctional facility a felony punishable by up to five years in prison and
a $10,000 fine. 37

§ 18-2510(3)(c), (4), (5)(b), (5)(c), LC. § 18-101

1). The State

not bother to address Mark's claims regarding its suppression of evidence that the
prosecutor facilitated pretrial communications between Bryan and Lee John, a State
witness, as well as communications between Bryan and his wife, Francoise.
For the reasons explained here and in his Appellant's Brief, the Brady violations
stemming from the State's failure to disclose the deals it made with Lane and Bryan, in
exchange for their testimony against Mark, prejudiced Mark. There is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence of the deals prosecutors made in exchange for snitch
testimony been disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different.
The only evidence specifically identifying Mark rather than Bryan as the Bravences'
killer, \Vas the testimony of Lane and Bryan. The more evidence the defense had to
discredit their testimony, including the incentives they had to testify against Mark, the
less weight jurors would have given to their testimony; evidence of the undisclosed plea
deals undermines confidence in the jury's verdicts. Moreover, Lane's and Bryan's false
testimony about the incentives given to them by prosecutors in exchange for their
testimony against Mark could have, in any reasonable likelihood, affected the judgment
of the jury, or had an effect on the outcome of the trial. For these reasons, the State's
Brady and Napue violations require that Mark's convictions be vacated and his case

remanded for a new trial.

37 Section

18-2510 was enacted in 2012 and replaced other code sections which
criminalized the possession of contraband in Idaho correctional facilities. The new statute
"modernize [d] contraband language to include communication devices which allows
persons to bypass security and engage in criminal activity inside and outside facility
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V.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mark's Rule 35 Motion To Correct An Illegal
Sentence, Or A Sentence Imposed In An Illegal Manner, Based On Untimeliness

State argues the mailbox rule does not apply because Mark was still
represented by counsel when his Rule 35 motion was filed. (Resp't Br., pp.76-83.) As
explained in his Appellant's Brief, Mark's Rule 35 motion was filed after his notice of
appeal was filed by his trial counsel, and after the SAPD was appointed to represent him
on appeal. Counsel took no part in drafting the Rule 35, no part in filing the Rule 35, and
while both Mark and counsel argued portions of the Rule 35 at the February 12, 2009,
hearing, Mark handled most of the arguments. (2/12/09 Hrg. Tr., p.15, L.4
(Kovis's Rule 35 argument), p.19, L.2

p.18, L.23

p.22, L.3 (Mark's Rule 35 argument), p.30, L. 19

- p.32, L.3 (Mark's response to State's Rule 35 argument). The State disregards Mark's
reliance on State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 204 (Ct. App. 1990), the facts of which are
virtually identical to his case, and claims this Court had no idea that the defendant in Lee
was represented by counsel when it allowed the defendant to rely on the mailbox rule to
render his otherwise untimely appeal timely. (Resp't Br., pp.81-82.)
Although Mark maintains Lee is controlling, he also notes that trial counsel was
not engaged in any activity resembling the practice of law with respect to his Rule 35.
The practice of law as generally understood, is the doing or
performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending [sic]
therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity with the adopted
rules of procedure. But in a larger sense, it includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts by which legal
rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be depending
{sicJ in a court.

walls. The proposed Section 18-2510, Idaho Code, will enhance safety and security in
correctional facilities statewide." Statement of Purpose, RS 20850.
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The drafting of the documents alleged to have been prepared by
defendant, or the giving of advice and counsel with respect thereto, by one
not a licensed attorney at law, would constitute an unlawful practice of
whether or not a charge was made therefor, and even though the
documents or advice are not actually employed in an action or proceeding
pending in a court.

Idaho State Bar v. Meservy, 80 Idaho 504, 508-09 (1959) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); see also Citibank (S Dakota), NA. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 260
(2009); Idaho State Bar v. Villegas, 126 Idaho 191, 1931 ( 1994 ).
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, "When a lawyer prepares
legal documents on behalf of a prisoner and arranges for those documents to be signed
and filed, the prisoner is not proceeding without assistance of counsel." Stillman v.

LaAfarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Here, because trial
counsel engaged in no activities that would be considered the practice of law with respect
to the preparation, signing and filing of Mark's Rule 35 motion, the mailbox rules
applies. Because Mark's Rule 35 motion is timely under the mailbox rule, this Court must
remand Mark's case for a decision on the merits of his Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained herein and in Mark's Appellant's Brief, this Court
should vacate Mark's judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand his case for a
new trial. Alternatively, this Court should vacate the district court's order denying his
Rule 35 motion as untimely, and remand his case for a decision on the merits.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2015.

r. Lankford
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